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ENHANCING FORENSIC-TOOL
SECURITY WITH RUST: DEVELOPMENT
OF A STRING EXTRACTION UTILITY
Jens Getreu, Olaf Maennel
Taltech, Tallinn University of Technology
Ehitajate tee 5
19086 Tallinn, Estonia

ABSTRACT
The paper evaluates the suitability of the Rust ecosystem for forensic tool development. As
a case study, a forensic tool named Stringsext is developed. Starting from analyzing the
specific requirements of forensic software in general and those of the present case study, all
stages of the software development life-cycle are executed and evaluated.Stringsext is a reimplementation and enhancement of the GNU-strings tool, a widely used program in forensic
investigations. Stringsext recognizes Cyrillic, CJKV East Asian characters and other scripts
in all supported multi-byte-encodings while GNU-strings fails in finding these in UTF-16 and
other encodings. During the case study it has become apparent that the Rust ecosystem
provides good support for secure coding principles and unit testing. Furthermore, the benchmarks showed a satisfactory performance of the resulting Stringsext binaries comparable to
the original C version.
Keywords: Forensic analysis, string search, multi-byte encoding, Rust language,
Stringsext-tool

1.

INTRODUCTION

an electronic trace (observation) with a wellknown cause-effect-relationship between the
observation and the human action causing
it (activity), is a so called artefact. For
the sake of simplicity we present here a
rather simplistic view associating univocally
one trace (artefact/observation) with only
one possible cause/activity. In the physical
world, one trace might have several possible causes which cannot be excluded a priori. For this reason, modern forensics favors the Likelihood Ratio approach, in which
the degree of support of the observations
for the hypotheses is considered, providing a
strength of evidence (diagnostic value) that

Human interaction with electronic devices
leaves traces in their electronic memory. In
the age of cloud computing most human interaction triggers requests to distant servers
leaving traces not only in their log files, but
also in many intermediate network devices.
Due to the cross-linked nature of computer
systems the data that needs to be taken into
consideration when investigating a crime is
enormous. In this huge amount of information the investigator has to find those specific bits of information constituting digital
evidences. In the domain of digital forensics
46
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is relative to the hypotheses tested. It embodies any “item of interest that helps an investigation move forward.” (Harichandran,
Walnycky, Baggili, & Breitinger, 2016, p.
125)1 .
Forensic examiners, the law enforcement
personnel who deal with digital evidence,
face inter alia two challenges: to collect and
to preserve the huge amount of data that
may be related to a crime and to search
and detect artifacts in the collected data.
The latter aspect implies the so called string
search which is useful when dealing with
unknown binary data. Most binary data
contain human readable character sequences
called strings. A very commonly used program to extract strings from a binary data
is the so called GNU-strings program. Although still widely used, GNU-strings has
only a very rudimentary support for multibyte encodings such as Unicode. Furthermore, it was subject several to memory
safety vulnerabilities which exclude the handling of potentially harmful forensic data.
The software tool Stringsext, developed in
this present work, is made for same purpose.
The new development is designed to overcome both shortcomings. Where possible, it
maintains GNU-strings’ user-interface.
In the following section we analyze general tool requirements in digital forensics.
Together with the shortcomings of the original GNU-strings tool, it becomes obvious
that the C++ programming language does
not satisfy the indispensable security requirements in the field of forensic software.
The remaining sections show how the Rust-

language mitigates them and what should be
observed during implementation.

1

Cf. Harichandran (Harichandran et al., 2016,
p. 131) who proposed a more formal definition: A
Curated (digital) Forensic Artefact (CuFA) “must
have evidentiary value in a legal proceeding, must be
created by an external force/artificially, must have
antecedent temporal relation/importance and must
be exceptional (based on accident, rarity, or personal
interest)[...]”.
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2. TOOL
REQUIREMENTS IN
DIGITAL FORENSICS
2.1

Multi-byte character
encoding support

Like in other established forensic disciplines
the forensic soundness and reliability of digital evidence depend on the validity and correctness of the forensic software used in examination. In other words, to guarantee that
the digital evidence is forensically sound, all
tools used to collect, preserve and analyze
digital evidences must be validated. Tool
validation can also be formally required by
standards like the ISO 17025 Laboratory Accreditation standard.
Validation is the confirmation by examination and the provision of objective evidence that a tool, technique or procedure functions correctly and as intended
(Craiger, Swauger, Marberry, & Hendricks, 2006, p. 92).
One way of establishing a set of requirements
for a new forensic tool is to analyze how similar existing tools are validated. Beckett and
Slay (Beckett & Slay, 2007) propose a functionality oriented validation method called
Model of tool neutral testing. Instead of testing if a software product meets all its requirements, an independent set of forensic
functions is defined and later tested. The
digital forensic discipline can be broadly defined in terms of the key functions Identification, Data Preservation, Data Analysis and Presentation of Digital Evidence.
Each key function is further divided into
subcategories. For example Data Analysis
c 2019 ADFSL
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breaks down into: Searching, File Rendering, Data Recovery, Decryption, Identification, Processing, Temporal Data and Process Automation. The first item searching
relates to finding and locating information
of interest in digital memories. Form a functional point of view the searching falls into
the searching domain (where), the searching
mode (how) and the searching target (what).
This breakdown of forensic functions into detailed categories allows to decouple the validation procedure from the implementation
of the forensic tool itself. Based on this categorization, independent test environments
are set up for each specific function. For example, a test may certify if the software is
able to run a fuzzy search for strings in the
unallocated disk space.
Beyond validation, the categorization of
forensic functions is also helpful to define
requirements for improvement existing tools
— in our case GNU strings. For example, Searching can be further classified into
groups as shown in the Figure 1 (Beckett
& Slay, 2007, p. 17). The leaves in the
diagram list typical capabilities a Searching-software can implement. For example
the subcategory “Character encoding” illustrates the main deficit of GNU-strings as it
supports only ASCII encoding. In a global
cyberspace, forensic tools must identify a
multitude of encodings. This leads us to the
main motivation and requirement of Stringsext: multibyte character encoding support.
The functionality oriented validation can
be classified as “black box testing” examining functionality without any knowledge of
the internal implementation, even without
having access to the source code. Its advantage is, that it allows to reuse the test environment thus reducing costs. Black box testing is sometimes also referred as “behavioral
testing” as it feeds the tool with known test
case data and observes if the tool outputs
the expected results. In the context of this

work black box testing is used to assert that
the developed tool Stringsext deals correctly
with big real-world input data: Stringsext
has been designed to produce, as a special
case, bit-identical output to that of GNUstrings. This way the comparison of the output data of both tools allowed to confirm
that stringsext is working correctly when
dealing with big data.
In addition to the above black box testing, Rust’s build in test harness (unit test) is
used in conjunction with the test driven development in order to guarantee maximum
security and correctness of the developed
tool.

c 2019 ADFSL

2.2

Security

“Make it hard for them to find you and impossible for them to prove they found you”.
With this concise word Berinato (2007) characterizes the relation between the criminal
and the forensic investigator. In digital
forensics this “hide-and-seek” game might
soon take a new dimension: Eggendorfer
(2016) stresses with good reasons that forensic tools are software too and therefor vulnerable to attacks: A vulnerability found
in 2017 in a common forensic tool EnCase Forensic Imager demonstrates exemplary the pertinence of the risk (Consult,
2017):
By writing a manipulated LVM2
partition (a hard disk format commonly used for Linux servers) on
a storage device, an attacker could
— if the device were ever to be analyzed using EnCase Forensic Imager — take over an investigator’s machine. When the investigator tries to read the device,
EnCase Forensic Imager crashes
— unbeknownst to the investigator,
however, a lot more is happening.
Through a buffer overflow security
Page 48
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Figure 1. The search target mapping, cf. (Beckett & Slay, 2007, p. 8)
flaw, EnCase Forensic Imager can
be tricked into executing data read
from the storage device. Afterwards
the code provided by the attacker
has full control of the investigator’s machine and can be used by
the suspect to manipulate evidence
(Consult, 2017).
Confronted with this vulnerability report,
the vendor downgraded the issue: “The exploit SEC Consult claims to have found is
an extreme edge case, much like the theoretical alerts they tried to promote in November. [...] We do not consider this claim to
be serious and it will not impact the performance of our products (Consult, 2017).” For
the user it remains unclear if and when the
vulnerability gets fixed. While such a reaction would have been inconceivable in other
software domains, the risk of forensic tool
exploitation is still largely neglected despite
Page 49

its potential impact:
• The adversary may be warned about an
ongoing investigation.
• The adversary may gain control of the
investigator’s machine and alter evidences.
TheStringsext-project addresses this risk by
choosing the programming language Rust.
Rust offers some outstanding security guarantees which are presented in Section 4.

2.3

Code efficiency

The searching domain in forensic investigations is often as large as the seized datacarrier. Nowadays hard-disk images hold
several TiB of data. Memory images of
the RAM are smaller, but still some GiB in
size. In order to address so big search domains, forensic software must operate very
efficiently. This is why forensic software
c 2019 ADFSL
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is often programmed in C or C++. But
not only the programming language matters:
Efficient code also requires carefully chosen abstractions, efficient algorithms avoiding unnecessary data-copies and programloops. Concerning the choice of the programming language we define the following
requirements: The programming language
should:

byte character encoding semantics in GNUstrings. GNU-strings encoding support consists of a rudimentary filter accessed with the
option --encoding. Please consult the manual page for more details. How well does
GNU-strings detect Unicode? The Figure
2 shows the content of a text file chosen
as test case. To find out how well GNU

• allow a fine control over pointers and
memory allocation,
• offer zero cost abstractions,
• have no or a minimal runtime system.
The above motivates the choice of developing Stringsext in Rust. Chapter 4 shows how
Rust meets the above requirements by its
memory safety guarantees and zero cost design goal.

3. GNU-STRINGS ’
SHORTCOMINGS IN
FORENSICS
This section first analyzes GNU-strings’
limitations concerning multi-byte-encodings
and international scripts. Based upon this
we derive a set of additional requirements
for Stringsext. Many forensic practitioners
use the GNU program strings, hereafter referred as GNU strings, to get a sense of the
functionality of an unknown program by extracting human readable strings from binary
data. Of special interest are for example
strings containing URLs to malicious sites,
often an indicator of malware activity. But
also, user prompts, error messages, and status messages can give valuable hints.

3.1

International character
encodings

As discussed above the main motivation for
developing Stringsext is the missing multic 2019 ADFSL

Figure 2. Test case international character
encodings
Strings deals with different Unicode encodings, the text-file is then is converted into
UTF-8, UTF-16LE, UTF-16BE, UTF-32LE and
UTF-32BE, each encoding in one file. In order to observe GNU-strings Unicode detection capabilities, all the test-files are then
searched for valid graphic strings with the
command strings using all possible variation of its encoding filter. The Figure 3
shows exemplary GNU-strings output for a
UTF-16 little endian encoded input.

Figure 3. GNU-strings with UTF-16LE encoded input
Results: UTF-8 is the only encoding in
which GNU strings is able to find international characters. The Figure 3, chosen as
an example, shows that with UTF-16 input,
GNU strings fails to recognize all non-ASCII
characters. The same holds true for UTF-32
and most other encodings: This limitation is
Page 50
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of particular importance in forensic investigations: The Microsoft-Windows operating
system handles Unicode characters in memory as 2 byte UTF-16 words. As a result
when dealing with Microsoft-Windows memory images, GNU-strings is not able to detect any international characters! It should
not be forgotten that GNU-strings is not designed to analyze multi-byte encodings in
general. This is why other very common
encodings e.g. big5 or koi8-r are not supported at all even though they are widely
used. The above-outlined limitations leads
to Stringsext’s main requirement: character
encoding support.

3.2

Secure coding

In the narrow sense, “secure coding” is
rather a design goal than a functional requirement. Secure coding denotes the practice of developing computer software by reducing the accidental introduction of security vulnerabilities by preventing coding errors or discovering and eliminating security
flaws during implementation and testing.
From the secure coding point of view the requirement character encoding support is the
most critical: The NIST National Vulnerability Database lists under the heading “character encoding” 22 vulnerabilities. Not only
new complex forensic software is affected by
vulnerabilities. It also concerns other wellestablished products: The tool GNU-strings,
part of the GNU binutils collection, became
publicly available in 1999 (Cygnus-Solutions,
1999). Today it has reached the notable age
of 17 years. GNU-strings is a comparatively
small program with 724 lines of code only. It
is all the more surprising that in 2014 the security researcher Zalewski (2014) discovered
a serious security vulnerability CVE-20148485 :
The setup group function
bfd/elf.c in libbfd in GNU
Page 51

in

binutils 2.24 and earlier allows
remote attackers to cause a denial
of service (crash) and possibly
execute arbitrary code via crafted
section group headers in an ELF
file.
Zalewski headlined his bug report “Don’t
run strings on untrusted files.” Needless to
say that this advice can not be followed in
the context of a forensic investigation. In
the meantime the bug was fixed but users
remain confused and bewildered.
Of particular importance is that the above
bugs are part of a vulnerability class related
to memory safety problems. GNU strings
is written in C, a language whose abstractions can not guarantee memory safety. In
order to exclude potential vulnerabilities of
the same kind from the outset, Stringsext
was developed in the Rust programming language.

4. THE RUST
PROGRAMMING
LANGUAGE
In the Section 2 we showed that the requirements code efficiency and security are
of paramount importance. This section illustrates how Rust supports these requirements with its zero cost abstractions and its
guaranteed memory safety (The-Rust-Team,
2019) motivating the choice of implementing
Stringsext in Rust.

4.1

Memory safety

All memory-related problems in C and C++
come from the fact that C programs can
unrestrainedly manipulate pointer to variables and objects outside of their memory
location and their lifetime. The Table 1
shows a selection of most common memory
safety related vulnerabilities (Corporation,
c 2019 ADFSL
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2016). Memory safe languages like Java
do not give programmers direct and uncontrolled access to pointers. For example, in
Java memory safety is guaranteed through
a resource costly runtime and a garbage collector. The related additional costs in terms
of runtime resources exclude programming
language like Java for most forensic tool development.
For many years program efficiency and
memory safety seemed to be an insurmountable discrepancy. Now, after 10 years of
development, a new programming language
called Rust promises to cope with this balancing act. Rust’s main innovation is the
introduction of semantics defining data ownership. This new programming paradigm
allows the compiler to guarantee memory
safety at compile-time. Thus, no resource
costly runtime is needed for that purpose.
In Rust most of the weaknesses listed in Table 1 are already detected at compile time.
Moreover, the Rust compiler guarantees that
none of these weaknesses can result in an undefined system state or provoke data leakage.
Rust’s main innovation is the introduction of new semantics defining ownership
and borrowing. Put in simplified terms, they
translate to the following three rules which
Rust’s type system enforces at compile time:
1. All resource (everything that can be
bound to a variable, e.g. integers, vectors, structures) has a unique owner.
2. Others can borrow from the owner
(technically borrowing means that another scope sets a pointer to the owner’s
resource).
3. The owner cannot free or mutate the resource while it is borrowed.
By enforcing the above rules Rust organizes
how resources are shared among different
scopes. Memory problems occur for instance
c 2019 ADFSL
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CWE ID
119

120
125
126
122
129
401

415
416
591
763

Name
Improper Restriction of Operations
within the Bounds of a Memory
Buffer
Buffer Copy without Checking Size
of Input (’Classic Buffer Overflow’)
Out-of-bounds Read
Buffer Over-read (’Heartbleed bug’)
Heap-based Buffer Overflow
Improper Validation of Array Index
Improper Release of Memory Before
Removing Last Reference (’Memory
Leak’)
Double Free
Use After Free
Sensitive Data Storage in Improperly Locked Memory
Release of Invalid Pointer or Reference

Table 1. Common weaknesses in C/C++
that affect memory

when a resource is referenced by multiple
pointers (aliasing) and when more than one
pointer writes to the same memory at the
same time (mutation). In contrast to other
languages, Rust’s semantics allow the type
system to ensure at compile time that simultaneous aliasing and mutation mutually exclude each other (cf. Table 2). As the check
is performed at compile-time, no run-time
code is necessary. Furthermore, Rust does
not need a garbage-collector: when owned
data goes out of scope it is immediately destroyed.
The following code samples (The-RustProject-Developers, 2017, Sec. 3.2) illustrate how the Rust compiler detects nonobvious hidden memory safety issues. The
function as str returns a pointer to a stack
allocated resource s that is freed at the end
of the function: we find ourselves with a
“Use after free” condition. The compiler
aborts with the error message s does not
live long enough.
Page 52
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Resource
sharing
move
ownership
shared
borrow
mutable
borrow

Aliasing
no

Enhancing Forensic-Tool Security with Rust
Mutation
yes

Example
let a=b

yes

no

let a=&b

no

yes

let a=&mut b

Table 2. Resource sharing in Rust

fn as_str(data: &u32) -> &str {
let s = format!("{}", data);
return &s
}

Here the corrected memory safe code performing a byte-copy at the end of the function.
fn as_str(data: &u32) -> String {
let s = format!("{}", data);
return s
}

The push() method in line 3 of the next example causes the backing storage of data to
be reallocated. As a result we have a dangling pointer vulnerability! Again, the Rust
compiler detects the error and code does not
compile.
let mut data = vec![1, 2, 3];
let x = &data[0];
data.push(4);
println!("{}", x);

Here the corrected memory safe version that
compiles:
let mut data = vec![1, 2, 3];
data.push(4);
let x = &data[0];
println!("{}", x);

4.2

Iterators

A very common group of programming mistakes is related to improper handling of indexes especially in loops, e.g. “CWE-129:
Page 53

Improper Validation of Array Index” (cf.
Table 3 (Corporation, 2016)).
CWE ID
119

125
129

Name
Improper Restriction of Operations
within the Bounds of a Memory
Buffer
Out-of-bounds Read
Improper Validation of Array Index

Table 3. Common weaknesses in C/C++
affecting memory avoidable with iterators
(Corporation, 2016)
In addition to traditional imperative loop
control structures, Rust offers efficient iteration with functional style iterators. Like
in Haskell iterators are lazy and avoid allocating memory for intermediate structures (you only allocate just when you call
.collect()). Iterators considerably enhance the robustness and safety of programs. They enable the programmer to iterate through vectors without explicitly naming neither the index nor its bounds, thus
avoiding common mistakes. The Figure 4
shows an example.
fet p: Vec<u8> = s.into_bytes();//plaintext
let mut c: Vec<u8> = vec![]; //ciphertext
for (cypherb, keyb) in p.iter()
.zip(key.iter().cycle().take(p.len())){
c.push(*cypherb ^ *keyb as u8);
}

Figure 4. Vigenère cipher in Rust

4.3

Zero-Cost Abstractions

It is the language design goal Zero-Cost Abstractions that makes the C/C++ language
so efficient and suitable for system programming. It means that libraries implementing
abstractions, e.g. vectors and strings, must
be designed in a way that the compiled binary is as efficient as if the program had been
c 2019 ADFSL
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written in Assembly. This is best illustrated
with memory layouts: Figure 5 shows a vector in Rust. Its memory layout is very similar is to a vector in C++. In contrast, the

the tool Stringsext (Getreu, 2018)(Getreu,
2017) was developed. The technical challenges such as concurrent batch processing of
multi-byte character streams revealed to be
sufficiently complex, thus allowing us to deduce general recommendations for forensictool development.

5.1
Figure 5. Memory layout of a Rust vector
memory safe language Java enforces a uniform internal representation of data. In Java
a vector has 2 indirections instead of 1 compared to Rust and C/C++ (cf. Fig. 6). As
the data could be represented in a more efficient way in memory, we see that Java does
not prioritize Zero-Cost-Abstraction as primary objective.

Figure 6. Memory layout of a Java vector

5. USE CASE:
DEVELOPMENT OF
THE
STRINGSEXT -TOOL
In the Section 2 we have analyzed the special requirements for tools in digital forensics: code efficiency and security. The Section 4 showed that Rust’s core properties
zero cost abstractions and memory safety in
theory meet well our requirements.
But how well is the Rust ecosystem suited
for forensic tool development? In order to
evaluate also the practical aspects of Rust,
c 2019 ADFSL

Encoding support

The initial motivation for developing Stringsext were the various shortcomings of GNUstrings especially when it comes to handle international character encodings. Does
Stringsext support foreign scripts better? Is
it as fast?
To evaluate Stringsext’s capabilities to
handle international scripts with Unicode,
we choose the same input text file (cf. Figure 2) we used with GNU-strings in the Section, 3.1. Stringsext’s output (cf. Figure
7) confirms that all international characters
are found correctly. Furthermore, Figure 8
illustrates how Stringsext’s formats its output when it operates in simultaneous multiencoding scanning mode.
Stringsext’s unique Unicode range restriction feature has shown itself to be of use in
practice: The Microsoft-Windows operating
system handles Unicode characters in memory as 2 byte UTF-16 words. Thus, searching for UTF-16 encoded strings in memory
images is common practice in forensics. This
is more difficult as expected, as almost every random byte combination is assigned to
a valid Unicode code point. Without further
measures such a search leads to many false
positives and unusable results. The offered
solution by Stringsext allows the user to restrict the Unicode-range: For example, the
Unicode-range U+400-U+7FF captures only
strings in Cyrillic, Armenian, Hebrew, Arabic and Syriac. This feature is particularly
useful when dealing with UTF-16 in memory
images.
Page 54
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Figure 7. Stringsext’s output with UTF-16LE
encoded input

Figure 9. Data processing and threads
Figure 8. Stringsext’s output in multiencoding scanning mode

5.2

Concurrency

The Figure 9 shows the data flow in Stringsext.
All scanner instances as well as
the merger-printer are designed as threads.
Rust uses OS-level threads and its type
and ownership model guarantees the absence
of data races. Rust supports by default
two models of inter-thread communication:
shared memory and message channels.
Stringsext first cuts the input stream into
overlapping slices of shared read-only memory pages, which are then fed into the different scanner threads. Each scanner operates independently in batch. It runs through
the input-slice, searches for valid string sequences, collects them in a list and finally
sends the list to a merger-printer -thread
though a dedicated message channel. This
thread collects all lists from the different
scanners and merges them into the final output stream.
Page 55

5.3

Algorithm

Batch processing of multibyte character
streams turned out to be more difficult than
expected. As we want to keep the scanning process as stateless as possible, we introduced overlapping windows: This allows
reading beyond the memory page’s edge in
case a found string terminates in the next
memory page. However, strings can be so
long that you can’t but cut them somewhere.
In this case we need to make sure not to cut
in the middle of a multi-byte character which
can be up to 6 bytes long. As a result a scanner is not completely stateless: between each
scanner run the position where the last run
stopped and a flag indicating the forced cut
of a string is passed.
The scanner decodes the input stream
in two phases: first it uses the Encoding-crate library to identify valid code sequences and transcodes them into valid
UTF-8 strings. Such a valid string may contain non-graphical and graphical characters.
As we are only interested in the latter, a second filter extracts graphical substrings while
meeting additional criteria, e.g. minimum
c 2019 ADFSL
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length or Unicode-range restriction rules.

6.

DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS
EVALUATION

Besides the contribution of the new tool
Stringsext to the forensic community a more
general consideration is of scientific interest:
Seeing that Rust is a very young programming language: how well is the Rust ecosystem suited for forensic tool development?
Forensic tools have to fulfill stringent requirements concerning their quality: In general, huge amount of data has to be processed which leads to most demanding requirements in terms code efficiency (cf. Section 2.3). Furthermore, the data to be analyzed is potentially dangerous: it may contain malicious payload targeting common
vulnerabilities (cf. Section 2.2). Finally,
in order to fulfill legal requirements forensic
tools must be extensively tested.
The present case study confirms our initial
hypothesis that Rust meets these requirements: Rust, as system programming language, is designed for code efficiency. In addition Rust guarantees memory safety, the
cause for a common category of vulnerabilities. It’s build in unit testing feature supports software verification as defined in the
Section 2.1.
Memory safety is checked at compile time
by Rust’s borrow checker: When a Rust
source code compiles, the resulting binary
is guaranteed to be memory safe. In consequence, such a binary is immune to memory safety related attacks: e.g. out-ofbounds read, buffer over-read, heap-based
buffer overflow, improper validation of array
index, improper release of memory before removing last, double free, use after free. As
Stringsext and all its used libraries are solely
Rust components, Stringsext is memory safe.
c 2019 ADFSL

JDFSL V14N2

We compared the code efficiency of GNUstrings implemented in C and Stringsext
implemented in Rust: When Stringsext is
run in ASCII-only mode, both produce
bit-identical output. The field experiment
yielded that even though Stringsext’s 2.4
times slower, the speed is within the same
order of magnitude. However, Stringsext’s
design implies much more complex computations, hence the result is not surprising.
How about the efficiency of Rust’s abstractions and its overall performance? A
good estimation is to compare benchmarks
of small and simple programs. Too complex programs should be avoided for this
purpose because variations of the programmer’s skills may bias the result. According to the “Computer Language Benchmark Game” (Fulgham & Gouy, 2019) Rust
and C/C++ have similar benchmark results,
which confirms our above measurements.
Forensic tools have to operate on many
architectures. Here enters Rust’s crosscompiling feature on scene.
As Rust
uses the LLVM framework as back-end, it
is available for most platforms.
rustc
--print target-list lists 80 compiler targets (rustc version 1.27).
As discussed above, Rust’s memory safety
guarantee is a huge improvement in terms
of security because a whole category of potential vulnerabilities can be ruled out from
the outset. However, memory safety does
not necessarily mean there is no bug. Beside the security aspects discussed above,
the correctness of forensic software is crucial
(cf. Section 2.1). It is clear that the overall correctness of a program also depend on
the correctness of every library used. Hence,
the question arises whether the Rust ecosystem is mature enough to meet the ambitious
requirements of forensic software. Indeed,
compared to C, Rust’s libraries are relatively
young. Here again extensive unit testing revealed to be a helpful diagnostic method: for
Page 56
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example one of the first versions 0.4.16 of the
kmerge function, part of the itertools library used in Stringsext, reversed under rare
conditions the first and second finding. Unit
testing revealed a bug in itertools. The
programmer responded quickly. It took only
some days after its appearance that the bug
was fixed with pull request #135. So far this
was the only time we encountered a bug in
the used libraries. One conclusion we draw
from this experience is, that young libraries
are more likely to have bugs than established ones. It cannot be emphasised enough
that diligent unit testing helps to find most
bugs at early state. However, unit testing
do not help against memory safety related
vulnerabilities, which are typical for C and
C++ programs and which can persist in software for decades. Taking into account these
benefits and drawbacks we largely prefer accepting the greater likelihood of manageable
bugs related to young Rust libraries, than
the uncertainty of hidden memory safety related vulnerabilities typical for C and C++.
Finally, we recognize the benefits of unit
testing throughout this work. For this reason
we chose for this project the test driven development method where unit testing is the
key element. Contrary to other methods, in
test driven development unit tests and the
to be tested code is always programmed by
the same person, which fitted well the setting of this project. However, other methods
may be as suitable depending on the organisational structure of the programmer team.

no guaranty that the compiled code is memory safe. Not only that the lack of memory
safety is one of the principal causes for most
software vulnerabilities, forensic software is
particularly exposed to such risks as it processes binary data of unknown origin containing all kinds of malware. As an alternative to C and C++, the relatively new programming language Rust offers guarantied
memory safety by design, while being as fast
as C. The match-making of general forensic
tool requirements and the theoretical properties of the Rust programming language
makes it an ideal alternative to the hitherto
dominant programming language C++. But
a general recommendation for a shift in programming practises can not be deduced from
theoretical considerations alone: this is why
we developed the Stringsext-Software as use
case.
The use case “development of the Stringsext-tool” shows that Rust was a good choice
for the present project, even though batch
processing of multi-bytes character streams
revealed to be far more complex than expected. Additionally, concurrent programming in Rust posed a hurdle at the beginning. Fortunately, the friendly Rust community helped to overcome occasional technical obstacles quickly. In addition, for a
not so experienced Rust programmer it is
reassuring to know that when a complex
piece of code finally compiles, it is memory
safe. The same applies to common settings
when a programmer has to refactor existing
code. Rust clears away doubts like “Do I free
the memory at the right moment? Is this
pointer still valid?” Furthermore, Rust is
especially suitable for bigger projects where
several programmers contribute to the same
code. And this is particularly true when developing forensic software with its high quality standards.
It has to be noted though that the Rust
ecosystem is still very young and bugs in

7.

CONCLUSION

We have shown that forensic tool development is subject to special requirements in
terms of memory safety and code efficiency.
Both are inherent properties of the used programming language and its ecosystem. Even
though the language design of C and C++
allows generating very efficient code, there is
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new libraries are nothing uncommon. Fortunately, the library maintainers are very responsive and a bug is usually fixed within
days. Here again unit testing becomes
handy. It does not only find bugs in our
own code at early stage, it also helps to identity bugs in external libraries. Used together
with the test driven development method,
the test code and the to be tested code can
be validated in one go.
Stringsext is currently in production state
and can be used in forensic investigations
as a GNU strings replacement. It is especially useful where GNU-strings fails: it allows finding UTF-16 multi-byte characters
in memory images and supports other multibyte encodings like big5 or koi8-r.

https://sourceware.org/ ml/
binutils-cvs/ 1999-q2/
msg00000.html.
Eggendorfer, T. (2016, July). IT forensics.
Why post-mortem is dead. Cyber
Security Summer School 2016: Digital
Forensics, Technology and Law.
Tallinn University of Technology.
Fulgham, B., & Gouy, I. (2019, February).
Computer Language Benchmarks
Game: C++ versus Rust.
https://benchmarksgameteam.pages.debian.net/
benchmarksgame/ faster/ rust.html.
Getreu, J. (2017). Forensic-Tool
Development with Rust (Unpublished
doctoral dissertation). Tallinn
University of Technology, Tallinn.
Getreu, J. (2018). Stringsext, a GNU
Strings Alternative with
Multi-Byte-Encoding Support. Tallinn.
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